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Negative Brief: Taiwan Arms Sales – Good

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY / OPENING QUOTES

Eight US Presidential administrations have supported Status Quo policy on Taiwan: Because it works

*Douglas Paal 2011 (Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ) “Disengaging from Taiwan” July/Aug 2011 FOREIGN AFFAIRS* <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2011-07-01/disengaging-taiwan>

There is a reason that eight U.S. administrations have embraced the same policy toward China and Taiwan, and that is because it serves U.S. interests in peace, prosperity, and stability. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are an important part of maintaining peace in the western Pacific.

INHERENCY

The age of big US arms sales to Taiwan is over

J. Michael Cole 2014 (*senior non-resident fellow at the China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, and an Associate researcher at the French Center for Research on Contemporary China (CEFC) in Taipei* ) 22 Oct 2014 From Gunboats to Nuts and Bolts <http://thinking-taiwan.com/from-gunboats-to-nuts-and-bolts/>

Despite the recent [optimism](http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/10/07/2003601473) expressed by some of the participants at the 13th annual U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference held earlier this month in Williamsburg, Virginia, the days when the U.S. sold billion dollars of military platforms to Taiwan are probably over. It has been more than three years since the U.S. released a major arms package for the island, the [longest period](http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf) since the early 1990s. Barring a radical shift in Washington, we can expect that the U.S. government will maintain its current strategy of seeking to avoid angering Beijing with major sales of military equipment to Taiwan — and this despite a hardening stance in the U.S. vis-à-vis a China that, after years of cajoling, has become increasingly belligerent.

HARMS/ SIGNIFICANCE

US arms sales to Taiwan are permitted under the 1982 Joint Communiqué

David J. Firestein 2014 (EastWest Institute, Vice President and Perot Fellow; 18 years worked as a US diplomat) Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 5 June 2014 “China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea” <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Firestein-USCC%20Testimony%20%28FINAL%29.pdf>

I regard U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as stabilizing and as a force for good for Taiwan and for cross-Strait relations, at least when viewed from a U.S. (and Taiwan) perspective. I believe they should continue indefinitely at a robust level in the general range of recent years’ sales; any dramatic decrease in arms sales to Taiwan under current circumstances would, I think, be destabilizing and harmful to the interests of the United States. While it is often pointed out that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are mandated by law, it is also worth flagging that they are also explicitly permitted under the 1982 Joint Communique, to which China is a signatory.

US arms sales are not the cause of the problem, they are a symptom

David J. Firestein 2014 (EastWest Institute, Vice President and Perot Fellow; 18 years worked as a US diplomat) Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 5 June 2014 “China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea” <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Firestein-USCC%20Testimony%20%28FINAL%29.pdf>

Third, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, which China construes as a major contributor to – if not the primary source of – cross-Strait tensions, are not, in fact, the core problem in the cross-Strait equation, but rather, a derivative symptom of the much deeper problems described above. It seems clear to me that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will continue precisely as long as the core issues remain unresolved. And thus, though the United States is clearly a stakeholder in cross-Strait issues, it is not the primary mover on them; China and Taiwan are. Similarly, strategic mistrust between China and the United States is not the primary impediment to resolution of the Taiwan issue; strategic mistrust between China and Taiwan is.

Arms sales aren’t causing China/Taiwan tensions, and they should continue until the tensions are resolved

David J. Firestein 2014 (EastWest Institute, Vice President and Perot Fellow; 18 years worked as a US diplomat) Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 5 June 2014 “China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea” <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Firestein-USCC%20Testimony%20%28FINAL%29.pdf>

I understand why China objects to these sales as a matter of principle, but I believe that China does not fully appreciate or “own” the impact of its own actions on Taiwan threat perceptions and Taiwan and U.S. decision-making. Most fundamentally, unless and until the underlying issues in the China/Taiwan dispute are resolved, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will continue. Arms sales, while a significant factor in the cross-Strait military and security picture, are a symptom of the enduring tensions, not the root cause. It is within China’s and Taiwan’s power to generate a cross-Strait context in which lower levels of arms sales are viewed by Taiwan as necessary, but we are not there yet, and until we get there, continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan make sense for the United States.

Arms sales aren’t causing China/Taiwan tensions. Turn: Taiwan can negotiate better if they have US arms sales

Richard C. Bush III 2014. (Director, [Center for East Asia Policy Studies](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/east-asia-policy-studies) and Senior Fellow, [Foreign Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy), [John L. Thornton China Center](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/china), Brookings Institution) 14 Jan 2014 Thoughts on U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan <http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2014/01/14-us-arms-sales-taiwan-bush>

My third point is to question the very premise of the PRC logic that created the linkage between U.S. arms sales, Taiwan’s willingness to negotiate, and whether China need to use force to fulfill its goals. Obviously, whether Taipei is willing to negotiate with Beijing is a function of its confidence that those negotiations won’t hurt Taiwan’s fundamental interests. Precisely because Beijing reserves the right to use force, the greater Taiwan’s ability to deter, the more confidence it will have to negotiate. And there is plenty of evidence that there is a weak correlation at best between U.S. arms sales and Taipei’s willingness to negotiate with Beijing. Just look at the last five years.

“All” US arms sales to Taiwan don’t hurt US relations, only specific types of weapons

William Ide 2011 (journalist) Voice of America News 21 May 2011 China Presses US to Reassess Law on Taiwan Arms Sales <http://www.voanews.com/content/china-presses-us-to-reassess-law-on-taiwan-arms-sales-122426244/167508.html> (brackets added)

In addition to criticizing the Taiwan Relations Act, [Chinese] General Chen [Bingde] said that China's response to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan would depend on the nature of the weapons sold to the island. [Brookings Institution analyst] Jonathan Pollack says that remark is significant. "It was not a kind of a categorical, any arms sales are absolutely illegitimate and unacceptable or something of that sort, which in theory he could have said, but chose not to.  So I don't know whether it indicates some flexibility, it may indicate some realism on the part of Chinese officials that some things will go through," he said.

US arms sales aren’t hurting China/Taiwan relationship

David J. Firestein 2014 (EastWest Institute, Vice President and Perot Fellow; 18 years worked as a US diplomat) Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 5 June 2014 “China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea” <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Firestein-USCC%20Testimony%20%28FINAL%29.pdf>

The third piece of the puzzle is the Taiwan-China relationship – how have U.S. arms sales to Taiwan affected the cross-Strait dynamic? The answer to this question depends on which aspect of the relationship one is looking at. In terms of economic, trade and cultural relations, it seems abundantly clear that U.S. arms sales have, in any case, not impeded the robust and dramatic development of cross-Strait ties. I think it would be hard to make the case that there is causality between the arms sales and the development of cross-Strait relations, because one would have to control for many other factors in the equation, but it would be hard to contest the fact that cross-Strait ties have blossomed even as the United States has sold arms to Taiwan.

Not a big deal: US arms sales to Taiwan are a manageable irritant to China

David J. Firestein 2014 (EastWest Institute, Vice President and Perot Fellow; 18 years worked as a US diplomat) Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 5 June 2014 “China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea” <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Firestein-USCC%20Testimony%20%28FINAL%29.pdf>

Private Chinese reaction to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan has generally been more textured and nuanced than public reaction. Privately, Chinese experts recognize that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are mandated by U.S. law and that they are not going to stop anytime soon. These experts understand, though do not generally agree with, U.S. reasoning for the sales, but acknowledge that change will take time. They also wonder aloud whether U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are driven mostly by the commercial interests of defense contractors. But within broad parameters, they see U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as a manageable irritant in China’s relationship with the United States and they don’t get as vexed about the issue as the Chinese government does at the official level.

Current policy on Taiwan has been successful at maintaining peace and allowing US-China relations to grow

David J. Firestein 2014 (EastWest Institute, Vice President and Perot Fello; 18 years worked as a US diplomat) Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 5 June 2014 “China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea” <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Firestein-USCC%20Testimony%20%28FINAL%29.pdf>

The architecture’s ambiguity contributes directly to its staying power and fairly consistent application over more than three decades – a second major strength. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the policy, whether one likes or dislikes it, the fact is, U.S. policy on Taiwan – as governed by the three-pronged policy architecture discussed above – has been remarkably consistent over five presidencies (Reagan, Bush, Clinton, Bush, Jr. and Obama) and across partisan lines in both the White House and in Congress. This staying power and consistency, coupled with the consistency of China’s doctrine and policies, has at least resulted in broad predictability surrounding cross-Strait military and security issues. Perhaps the most significant success of this architecture is that, whatever its weaknesses (to be discussed below), it has created a context within which Taiwan itself, China-Taiwan relations, and U.S.-China relations have been able to develop and blossom despite profound differences between the sides over several major issues.

SOLVENCY

1. No improvement in overall US/China relations.

Cutting Taiwan arms sales won’t help US/China relations on other issues

Richard C. Bush 2013 (senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and director of its Center on Northeast Asian Policy Studies ) Jan 2013 “Uncharted Strait” <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/1/14-taiwan-bush/14-taiwan-bush.pdf>

The second group misunderstands the benefits and costs of a significant American accommodation to China regarding Taiwan (e.g. by sharply cutting back arms sales). In fact, Washington has frictions with China on a growing list of issues. Conceding to Beijing on Taiwan will not help us elsewhere. Moreover, our friends and allies (e.g. Japan and Korea) will worry that the United States might sacrifice their interests next for the sake of good relations with China.

Removing the Taiwan issue would not reduce US/China conflict – too many other issues remain

Richard C. Bush 2013 (senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and director of its Center on Northeast Asian Policy Studies ) Jan 2013 “Uncharted Strait” <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/1/14-taiwan-bush/14-taiwan-bush.pdf>

Although Taiwan has at times been the most important source of U.S.-China conflict, it is not the only one. For example, Beijing’s goals in East Asia are not limited to bringing the island back into the PRC fold. In addition, it seeks to expand its security perimeter away from its eastern and southern coast, where it was for decades. That in turn has meant that the PLA navy and air force are operating increasingly in the traditional domain of U.S. and Japanese forces. Removing Taiwan as a problem would in no way end or reduce this mutual impingement; it would only change its location. Taiwan aside, Beijing would still regard American “socialization” as negative.

Negotiations won’t solve. We need to maintain SQ position on arms sales until China changes its negotiating position, because Taiwan cannot accept any deals China is offering

Richard C. Bush III 2014. (Director, [Center for East Asia Policy Studies](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/east-asia-policy-studies) and Senior Fellow, [Foreign Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy), [John L. Thornton China Center](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/china), Brookings Institution) 14 Jan 2014 Thoughts on U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan <http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2014/01/14-us-arms-sales-taiwan-bush>

But, there is another, basic reason why Taiwan is reluctant to negotiate with China. That is, Beijing’s formula for resolving the fundamental dispute between it and Taiwan. That formula, one country, two systems, has been around for over thirty years, and its acceptability on Taiwan is about as low in the early 2010s as it was in the 1980s. There is a broad consensus on the island – Blue and Green – that one country, two systems is fundamentally flawed and incompatible with Taiwan’s interests. That would seem to be a good reason *not*to negotiate on the fundamental dispute, even though there might be other, lesser issues on which talks are useful. But there is no reason for the United States or anyone else to accept the PRC logic on arm sales and the prospects of negotiations. The better way for Beijing to achieve its political goals concerning Taiwan would be to make a more acceptable offer.

2. AFF Policy has already been tried and failed.

Obama tried reducing arms sales and reducing support for Taiwan. Result: China became more aggressive and US/China relations got worse

Daniel Blumenthal 2011 (Director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute; commissioner on the U.S. China Economic and Security Commission) 2 Mar 2011 [Rethinking U.S. foreign policy towards Taiwan](http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/03/02/rethinking-u-s-foreign-policy-towards-taiwan/), FOREIGN POLICY <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/03/02/rethinking-u-s-foreign-policy-towards-taiwan/>

The Obama administration came to power in step with this theory. First, the administration initially viewed the biggest obstacle to Sino-U.S. stability as Washington’s misreading of Chinese intentions which they thought were actually quite limited. The greatest risk to peace, they argued, was that the United States would overreact to China’s rise. The Obama administration called its new policy "strategic reassurance": we would reassure China that we would not contain it. Second, the United States has basically abandoned its commitment to Taiwan under the [Taiwan Relations Act](http://www.taiwandocuments.org/tra01.htm" \t "_blank). The only action the Obama administration has taken consistent with the TRA was the sale of half an arms package left over from the Bush years. There has been no serious effort on the part of the Obama administration to enhance Taiwan’s security. The Obama administration has arguably taken the most minimalist interpretation of the TRA since the law’s passage. The third policy change occurred in Taiwan. Taipei has followed a policy of reconciliation and removed any conceivable "threat" of "independence" (always a red herring; according to Taiwan’s democratic procedures it is practically impossible to vote for independence). And how has China reacted to all of these concessions, including the de facto abandonment of Taiwan? By pressing other territorial claims, intimidating allies elsewhere, and rejecting calls for better military relations with the United States. In short, Washington took all the steps that Glaser called for and Sino-U.S. relations have rarely been worse.

3. The 1982 Reagan communique is unworkable

It wrongly assumes we can take actions based on China’s “intentions,” which we can’t verify and can change rapidly

Richard C. Bush III 2014. (Director, [Center for East Asia Policy Studies](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/east-asia-policy-studies) and Senior Fellow, [Foreign Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy), [John L. Thornton China Center](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/china), Brookings Institution) 14 Jan 2014 Thoughts on U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan <http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2014/01/14-us-arms-sales-taiwan-bush>

My second point has to do with odd, asymmetric character of the bargain undertaken in the August 1982 Communique. Simply put, Beijing makes a commitment about its intentions (that is, it commits to strive for a peaceful solution) in return for a U.S. commitment to restrict Taiwan’s military capabilities. The problem, of course, is that intentions are eminently and quickly reversible while creating or restoring capabilities can take a long time. Moreover, Beijing’s statement of its intentions has always been stated in an ambiguous way, and it has always reserved the right to determine whether circumstances have changed to the point that a change in intentions is necessary. This asymmetry between PRC intentions and ROC capabilities may not have been such a big issue at the time that the Communique was signed, but that has changed. As “Threading the Needle” clearly explains, China’s acquisition and use of its capabilities since the early 1990s calls into question its peaceful intent. Based on its own logic, however, China would say that its acquisition and use was made necessary by actions by Taiwan leaders that frustrated China’s desire for a peaceful solution.

DISADVANTAGES

1. China takes over Taiwan

Link & Brink: US arms sales are key to Taiwan being able to hold on long enough for US military intervention to come to the rescue – or to deter an attack in the first place

Richard C. Bush 2014 (Director, [Center for East Asia Policy Studies](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/east-asia-policy-studies) and Senior Fellow, [Foreign Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy), [John L. Thornton China Center](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/china)) 14 Jan 2014 Thoughts on U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan <http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2014/01/14-us-arms-sales-taiwan-bush>

My fifth and final point has to do with the political character of arms sales versus their military value. Of course, the U.S. transfer of advance weapons systems to Taiwan has a political character for both Beijing and Taipei. That is particularly true of civilian leaders in both places, who happen to be the folks that most of us talk to. But U.S. weaponry is not trivial in a military sense. From the U.S. perspective, its arms sales, whatever their political value for Taiwan, should also contribute to Taiwan’s ability to deter a Mainland attack or threat of attack. If we were to decide to come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of such an attack, we would need Taiwan to hold on for several weeks while we do all that would be needed to mount that defense. So Taiwan needs the capability to hold on. Optimally, if it possesses that capability then Beijing is less likely to consider an attack in the first place. In this regard, there is growing concern that Taiwan’s past defense strategy, on which its arms requests to the United States are based, is no longer appropriate to its threat environment, thus reducing the deterrent effect of the capabilities it has or might have.

Impact: Not worth the risk to get “better relations” because the impact is U.S. strategic disaster. Arms sales are key to prevent that from happening

Prof. Shyu-tu Lee 2011. (President of the North American Taiwanese Professors’ Association) *“Disengaging from Taiwan” July/Aug 2011 FOREIGN AFFAIRS* <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2011-07-01/disengaging-taiwan>

To prevent a crisis from escalating to nuclear war, Glaser says that the United States should back away from its commitment to Taiwan. Such accommodation, he argues, would smooth the way for better relations with China in the decades to come. Yet if Taiwan were to fall, the United States would suffer a geostrategic disaster. The sea-lanes and airspace around Taiwan are critical to the survival of Japan and South Korea. Once in control of Taiwan, China could turn Japan and South Korea into vassal states. With the demise of the U.S.-Japanese military alliance, the United States would be forced to retreat to Hawaii. To avoid that fate, Washington must reiterate that the future of Taiwan must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the Taiwanese people. It must deploy sufficient naval and air forces in the western Pacific to deter Chinese aggression, initiate high-level military exchanges with Taiwan to facilitate joint military planning, and speed up the sale to Taiwan of F-16 fighters and other weapons that would be useful in resisting a Chinese invasion.

“China doesn’t have the capability to invade Taiwan” – Response: They soon will.

Prof. Charles L. Glaser 2015. (*Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington Univ* ) A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Spring 2015 <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf>

China’s improved military capabilities may increase its willingness both to start and to escalate a Taiwan crisis. Fifteen years ago, China had little capability to invade or blockade Taiwan. Today it can begin to imagine successfully invading Taiwan, and its capability will only increase with time.

2. Chinese Aggression

Link: Taiwan’s request for arms sales comes from response to Chinese aggression

*Douglas Paal 2011 (Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ) “Disengaging from Taiwan” July/Aug 2011 FOREIGN AFFAIRS* <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2011-07-01/disengaging-taiwan>

Despite a gradual easing of tensions between China and Taiwan, Beijing continues to enhance its military capabilities with regard to Taipei. This has developed a vicious cycle. By choosing to increase the military offensive capability deployed opposite Taiwan, Beijing compels Taiwan's leadership to seek outside sources of support and arms to deter Chinese aggression. If Taiwan's leaders failed to find that support, their voters would remove them.

Link & Brink: Taiwan is key to blocking Chinese aggression on other issues

Richard C. Bush III 2013. (Director, [Center for East Asia Policy Studies](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/east-asia-policy-studies) and Senior Fellow, [Foreign Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy), [John L. Thornton China Center](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/china), Brookings Institution) 14 Jan 2013 Uncharted Strait <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/1/14-taiwan-bush/14-taiwan-bush.pdf>

Should the United States concede to China on Taiwan, the lessons that Beijing would learn about the intentions of the United States would likely discourage its moderation and accommodation on other issues like Korea or maritime East Asia; in that respect, America’s friends and allies are right. Continuity of U.S. policy toward Taiwan will not guarantee that China’s actions in other areas will support the status quo, but it increases the likelihood that it will. Conversely, a China that addresses its Taiwan problem with creativity and due regard to the views on the island says something positive about what kind of great power the PRC will be. A more aggressive approach, one that relies on pressure and intimidation, signals reason for concern about its broader intentions. In this regard, Taiwan is the canary in the East Asian coal mine.

Link & Brink: Any dramatic decrease in arms sales would be destabilizing and harmful to US interests

David J. Firestein 2014 (EastWest Institute, Vice President and Perot Fellow; 18 years worked as a US diplomat) Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 5 June 2014 “China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea” <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Firestein-USCC%20Testimony%20%28FINAL%29.pdf>

I regard U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as stabilizing and as a force for good for Taiwan and for cross-Strait relations, at least when viewed from a U.S. (and Taiwan) perspective. I believe they should continue indefinitely at a robust level in the general range of recent years’ sales; any dramatic decrease in arms sales to Taiwan under current circumstances would, I think, be destabilizing and harmful to the interests of the United States. While it is often pointed out that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are mandated by law, it is also worth flagging that they are also explicitly permitted under the 1982 Joint Communique, to which China is a signatory.

Link: They wouldn’t stop with Taiwan. China has motives to continue aggression even if/when/after they take Taiwan

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker & Bonnie Glaser 2011 (Tucker is Professor of History at Georgetown University and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Glaser is a Senior Fellow with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS and also a Senior Associate with the CSIS Pacific Forum) Should the United States Abandon Taiwan? WASHINGTON QUARTERLY <http://csis.org/files/publication/twq11autumntuckerglaser.pdf>

Fears among the leadership concerning mounting social unrest, spurred by the Jasmine Revolutions in the Middle East, produced harsh restrictions of the media and the Internet along with the imprisonment of artists, underground church members, protesting peasants, lawyers, and human rights activists. Regaining Taiwan is unlikely to provide a broad and enduring balance to internal unhappiness. Beijing also confronts militant nationalism which, though fostered by the government, is still difficult to control. Any suspicion that authorities are not adequately safeguarding Chinese interests and securing international respect could threaten regime stability. Accordingly, a U.S. sacrifice of Taiwan, while gratifying, could not thoroughly slake a continuing need for Beijing to demonstrate its power. Indeed, the sacrifice might promote new appetites and necessitate fresh efforts to satisfy that need.

Impact: Reducing our response to Chinese military modernization increases risk of nuclear attack on the US homeland

Prof. Shyu-tu Lee 2011. (President of the North American Taiwanese Professors’ Association) *“Disengaging from Taiwan” July/Aug 2011 FOREIGN AFFAIRS* <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2011-07-01/disengaging-taiwan>

But by ignoring China's history and economic policy and other relevant factors, Glaser arrives at policy prescriptions that would increase the chance of a Chinese nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland. Glaser misjudges Chinese motives. China's military modernization is not primarily motivated by insecurity, as he asserts. China is not threatened by the United States or any of its neighbors. It is advocating its model of governance -- managed capitalism combined with one-party authoritarianism -- as a more efficient alternative to a free-market economy and democracy. China's mission is to regain its place as the dominant superpower so that the country can cleanse itself of the humiliation it has experienced at the hands of the West.

3. Lost US economic benefits

US companies generate revenue from Taiwan arms sales

Wendell Minnick 2011. (B.S., M.A., is an author, commentator, journalist and speaker who has spent two decades covering military and security issues in Asia, including one book on intelligence and over 1,000 articles; currently Asia Bureau Chief for [Defense News](http://www.defensenews.com/), a Washington-based defense weekly newspaper) Report: Arms to Taiwan Help U.S. Economy 18 Apr 2011 <http://minnickarticles.blogspot.fr/2011/04/report-arms-to-taiwan-help-us-economy.html>

The CRS report, “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990,” by Shirley Kan, indicates that Taiwan arms sales generate big revenue for U.S. defense companies despite the absence of a defense treaty with Taiwan. In 2007, Taiwan bought $3.7 billion in U.S. arms; in 2008, $6.4 billion; and in 2010, $6.4 billion. No sales to Taiwan were approved in 2009. Among customers of U.S. arms worldwide, Taiwan ranked fourth behind Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia from 2002 to 2009.

4. Weakens US alliances in East Asia

Link: Cutting arms sales to Taiwan would make Japan and S. Korea doubt their alliance with the US

Richard C. Bush III 2013. (Director, [Center for East Asia Policy Studies](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/east-asia-policy-studies) and Senior Fellow, [Foreign Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy), [John L. Thornton China Center](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/china), Brookings Institution) 14 Jan 2013 Uncharted Strait <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/01/14-taiwan-bush>

The second group misunderstands the benefits and costs of a significant American accommodation to China regarding Taiwan (e.g. by sharply cutting back arms sales). In fact, Washington has frictions with China on a growing list of issues. Conceding to Beijing on Taiwan will not help us elsewhere. Moreover, our friends and allies (e.g. Japan and Korea) will worry that the United States might sacrifice their interests next for the sake of good relations with China.

Link: Japan and S. Korea would believe that if we abandon Taiwan, we would abandon them

Richard C. Bush III 2013. (Director, [Center for East Asia Policy Studies](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/east-asia-policy-studies) and Senior Fellow, [Foreign Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy), [John L. Thornton China Center](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/china), Brookings Institution) 14 Jan 2013 Uncharted Strait <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/1/14-taiwan-bush/14-taiwan-bush.pdf>

U.S. allies and partners—Japan, the Republic Korea, and others not necessarily in the Asian region—have have much at stake in Washington’s future approach to Taiwan. Simply put, a United States that would abandon Taiwan could abandon them. Of course, there may be hypothetical reasons why America might withdraw support that stem from Taiwan’s policies rather than its own commitment. So the reasons for any abandonment would be important. But the fear remains.

Impact: Strong US/Japan alliance is key to prosperity and success of the Asia-Pacific region

Ian Easton, Randall Schriver, and Sabrina Tsai 2014. (Easton – master’s degree in China studies; research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, a Virginia-based think tank where he conducts research on defense and security issues involving the U.S., China, Japan, and Taiwan. Schriver - founding partners of Armitage International LLC, a consulting firm that specializes in international business development and strategies; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Tsai - research associate at the Project 2049 Institute, where she conducts research and monitors U. S. foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region) THE ALLIANCE - TOWARD A STRONGER U.S.-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP 18 July 2014 <http://www.project2049.net/documents/US_Japan_SPF_Capstone_Paper_2014.pdf>

The most important aspect of Japan’s national security strategy is its defensive alliance with the United States. Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S. security commitment to Japan has served as an anchor stabilizing the region and enabling growth. The stunning political and economic transformation of post-war Japan created the world’s second most prosperous country after the United States and a model for other aspiring regional powers to follow. Arguably, democracy and prosperity would not have flourished in South Korea and Taiwan in the absence of the U.S.-Japan alliance; Australia, Singapore and Hong Kong would not enjoy their current standards of living; and China would not be an emerging great power. In ways large and small the U.S.-Japan alliance has served as a pillar supporting the dramatic rise of the Asia-Pacific on the world stage.

Impact: Strong US/S.Korea alliance is key to regional and global security

Charles L. Pritchard, John H. Tilelli Jr. and Scott A. Snyder 2010 (chairs of the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force #64. Pritchard – masters degree in International Studies; formerUS ambassador and special negotiator with North Korea. Tilelli - retired US Army general, former commander of US forces in S. Korea. Snyder- senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations) US POLICY TOWARD THE KOREAN PENINSULA, <https://books.google.com/books?id=rLA3eU8_9nwC&pg=PT40&lpg=PT40&dq=u.s.+alliance+%22south+korea%22+stability&source=bl&ots=VLR8COemph&sig=uOQiXcC1Yd23QCFWnF62td3uk0Q&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CDQQ6AEwA2oVChMIy5HHhb3oxwIVjbCACh2k6QeD#v=onepage&q=u.s.%20alliance%20%22south%20korea%22%20stability&f=false>

